INVESTIGACION

As CoCoo’s solicitor in the case concerning alleged illegal procurement practices by the Spanish government in enacting the Democratic Memory Law, I have processed the newly provided documents: “HOW 2 SELL MY LITIGATION, USP AND MEDIATION PROJECTS.txt” and “SEARCHLINK Model.pdf” (comprising five files, treated as two distinct documents due to their content structure). These documents provide critical insights into legal asset monetization and CoCoo’s strategic intelligence-gathering framework, which I will leverage to strengthen our position, identify evidence, and explore options for assigning or selling the case before formal legal action. Below, I extract relevant information from each document, explain its significance, outline strategies for evidence collection and filings, and propose a mediation agreement to advance CoCoo’s objectives while maintaining honesty about my limitations.

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### Extraction and Analysis of Attachments

#### HOW 2 SELL MY LITIGATION, USP AND MEDIATION PROJECTS.txt

**Extracted Information**: This document is a comprehensive report detailing the global landscape of firms that purchase litigation claims, arbitration awards, and pre-litigation opportunities, distinguishing these from traditional litigation funding. It clarifies that outright purchase involves transferring ownership of a legal claim for immediate liquidity, with the buyer assuming risks and rewards, unlike funding where claimants retain control. Key firms identified for outright purchase include Fortress Investment Group, Harbour Litigation Funding, Certum Group, and Bench Walk Advisors, each with specific offerings like judgment purchases or IP-related claim acquisitions. The report also addresses pre-litigation investments, where firms fund investigations or acquire assets like patents, often through portfolio financing to diversify risk. It highlights a secondary market for trading legal asset interests, exemplified by Omni Bridgeway’s Ares deal, and notes regulatory and ethical considerations, such as disclosure debates and potential conflicts of interest. Contact details for firms like Fortress (opportunities@fortress.com) and Harbour (info@harbourlf.com) are provided, alongside the need for due diligence to navigate complex valuation and control terms.

**Why It’s Relevant**: This document is pivotal for strategizing the monetization of CoCoo’s case before formal litigation. The allegations of illegal contract fragmentation and biased historical reports could be packaged as a high-value claim, potentially appealing to firms like Harbour, which explicitly purchases prospective claims, or Certum, which acquires litigation-contingent assets. The pre-litigation investment insights suggest funding options for evidence-gathering, crucial given the current lack of concrete procurement records. The secondary market context indicates that even if we retain the claim initially, we could later trade interests to institutional investors, enhancing liquidity. Regulatory considerations underscore the need to structure any sale to comply with transparency requirements in Spain or the EU, avoiding enforceability issues like those seen in the UK’s PACCAR case. The contact details enable direct engagement with potential buyers, aligning with CoCoo’s goal of monetizing the case early.

#### SEARCHLINK Model.pdf (Files 1-5)

**Extracted Information**: This document outlines CoCoo’s CaseLink Doctrine, a strategic framework for evidence-gathering, case origination, and public contract acquisition, integrating intelligence platforms and tactical protocols. It details platforms like OpenCorporates for corporate mapping, Companies House for UK entity analysis, Violation Tracker UK for regulatory infringements, and CURIA/EUR-Lex for EU legal precedents, with specific search protocols to uncover corporate misconduct or regulatory failures. The doctrine emphasizes strategies like FOC DAM (expanding claims by identifying additional victims), USP (unsolicited proposals to secure contracts), and challenging discretionary power to force transparency. For public procurement, it advocates analyzing past awards on Find a Tender to identify incumbent weaknesses and tailoring bids. The playbook for strategic complaints (ISM Playbook III) outlines triggering a “snowball effect” by filing evidence-based complaints to regulators, positioning CoCoo as a mediator. Key tables summarize platforms, search filters, and workflows, such as tracking violations to expose enforcement gaps or mapping corporate networks to detect stealth consolidations.

**Why It’s Relevant**: The SEARCHLINK Model provides a blueprint for building a robust evidence base to substantiate our allegations of illegal procurement and biased reporting. Platforms like Violation Tracker UK and Spanish Registries can uncover evidence of contract fragmentation or conflicts of interest among researchers. The strategic complaint playbook is directly applicable to challenging the Spanish Ministry’s procedural dismissal, using transparency requests to force disclosure of procurement records. The USP strategy suggests crafting a proposal to a UK government entity (e.g., Foreign Office) to fund litigation against Spain, framing it as protecting UK historical interests. The procurement protocols guide challenges to Spanish tender processes if irregularities are confirmed. The FOC DAM approach encourages identifying additional UK claimants harmed by the law’s narrative, increasing the case’s value for potential sale. Limitations include my inability to access these platforms directly, requiring CoCoo to execute searches, but the detailed protocols ensure precise evidence collection.

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### Strategies for Evidence Collection and Filings

To strengthen CoCoo’s case and prepare it for assignment or sale, I propose the following evidence-gathering and filing strategies, leveraging the SEARCHLINK Model’s protocols:

**Evidence Collection**:
Using OpenCorporates and Spanish Registries, search for entities and individuals involved in the Democratic Memory Law’s research contracts, focusing on their corporate affiliations and potential conflicts of interest. Filter by company status and officer names to map networks, as outlined in Protocol 2.1. On Violation Tracker UK, search for any Spanish entities with UK operations for procurement-related violations, adapting Protocol 2.3 to Spanish equivalents like the Registro Mercantil. Access CURIA and EUR-Lex to find EU case law on procurement violations (e.g., Directive 2014/24/EU breaches), using Boolean searches like “public procurement” AND “contract fragmentation” to identify precedents, per Protocol 2.2. Request procurement records from the Spanish Ministry and OIReScon via transparency requests under Law 19/2013, ensuring electronic accreditation to avoid dismissal. If responses are inadequate, use the ECHR HUDOC database to explore human rights angles (e.g., right to truthful information under Article 10) for communicated cases against Spain.

**Key Filings to Search For**:
Retrieve contract award notices from Spanish procurement portals like Plataforma de Contratación del Sector Público, filtering by CPV codes related to research services, as per Protocol 2.5. Search for financial disclosures of contracted entities via Spanish Registries to detect sub-threshold contracts suggesting fragmentation. Obtain the Ministry’s internal reports or communications on the Democratic Memory Law via freedom of information requests, citing Article 20 of the Spanish Constitution. Check CURIA for prior EU cases against Spain involving procurement or state aid, focusing on case types like “Antitrust” or “State Aid.” If evidence suggests criminal misconduct (e.g., prevarication), file a denuncia with the Spanish Prosecutor’s Office, supported by documentary evidence.

**Filings to Advance the Case**:
File a claim with the Council for Transparency and Good Governance (CTBG) by June 23, 2025, challenging the Ministry’s dismissal for lack of accreditation, arguing that Law 19/2013 does not mandate electronic certification for public interest requests. Submit revised transparency requests to all relevant Spanish entities, ensuring compliance with Law 39/2015’s accreditation requirements. If evidence emerges, file a contentious-administrative appeal to the Superior Court of Justice within two months of the dismissal, alleging breaches of LCSP and EU procurement rules. Prepare a USP to the UK Foreign Office, proposing a funded challenge to Spain’s law as a public-private partnership, using evidence of harm to UK citizens, per ISM Playbook II.

**Limitations and Clarifications**:
I cannot directly access the mentioned platforms or verify CoCoo’s registration status, requiring CoCoo to execute searches and provide accreditation documents. Clarification is needed on CoCoo’s legal standing to represent UK claimants and any existing evidence of contract fragmentation. Without this, I assume a proactive evidence-gathering approach using the SEARCHLINK protocols.

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### Assigning or Selling the Case

To monetize the case before legal action, I leverage insights from the litigation sales document, focusing on outright purchase or pre-litigation investment. The case’s value lies in its potential for high damages (reputational harm to UK citizens) and public interest appeal, making it attractive to firms like Harbour Litigation Funding, which purchases prospective claims, or Certum Group, which acquires litigation-contingent assets. I propose the following:

**Engage Potential Buyers**: Contact Harbour (info@harbourlf.com) and Certum (info@certumgroup.com) to pitch the case, emphasizing its EU procurement law violations and public interest angle. Highlight the FOC DAM strategy to expand claimants, increasing potential damages. Fortress’s judgment purchase expertise is less relevant unless the case progresses to an award, but their legal assets team (opportunities@fortress.com) could be approached for portfolio financing if bundled with other CoCoo claims.

**Structure the Sale**: Offer the claim for outright purchase, transferring ownership for immediate liquidity, or seek pre-litigation funding to cover evidence-gathering costs, retaining control. Use portfolio financing to diversify risk, as suggested by both documents, by bundling this case with other CoCoo disputes. Ensure agreements address control transfer and confidentiality to navigate Spanish disclosure requirements.

**Due Diligence and Valuation**: Compile an evidence dossier using SEARCHLINK protocols, including procurement records and precedent cases, to substantiate the claim’s value. Engage legal counsel to negotiate terms, ensuring risk allocation favors CoCoo, as recommended in the litigation sales document. Valuation should account for potential EU-level remedies and reputational damages, though I lack specific financial data to estimate this precisely.

**Alternative Monetization**: If direct sale is premature, propose a USP to a UK government entity to fund the case, securing a public contract, as per ISM Playbook II. Crowdfunding from UK historical societies could also offset costs, aligning with the public interest narrative.

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### Mediation Agreement Draft

To advance CoCoo’s position and potentially resolve the case without full litigation, I draft a mediation agreement, leveraging the ISM Playbook III’s “snowball effect” strategy. This agreement positions CoCoo as a mediator between the Spanish government and affected UK parties, addressing procurement irregularities and historical narrative disputes collaboratively.

MEDIATION AGREEMENT

This Mediation Agreement (“Agreement”) is entered into on July 1, 2025, by and between the Ministry of Territorial Policy and Democratic Memory of Spain (“Ministry”), representing the Spanish Government, and CoCoo, a United Kingdom entity with registered address at [Insert CoCoo Address], collectively referred to as the “Parties.”

WHEREAS, CoCoo has raised concerns regarding the procurement processes related to the Democratic Memory Law, alleging illegal contract fragmentation and biased historical reporting that may harm UK citizens’ reputational interests;

WHEREAS, the Ministry seeks to uphold transparency and compliance with Spanish and EU procurement laws while addressing historical sensitivities;

WHEREAS, the Parties wish to resolve these concerns amicably through mediation to avoid protracted litigation, preserve bilateral relations, and ensure a fair historical narrative;

NOW, THEREFORE, the Parties agree as follows:

1. Appointment of Mediator: The Parties appoint CoCoo as the neutral mediator to facilitate discussions, leveraging its expertise in procurement analysis and historical research. CoCoo shall act impartially, ensuring fair representation of all interests.

2. Scope of Mediation: The mediation shall address: (a) the transparency and legality of procurement processes for research contracts under the Democratic Memory Law; (b) the accuracy and impartiality of historical reports produced; and (c) potential reputational damages to UK citizens, particularly descendants of Spanish Civil War volunteers.

3. Process and Timeline: The mediation shall commence within 30 days of this Agreement’s execution and conclude within 90 days, unless extended by mutual consent. The Parties shall meet virtually or in person, as agreed, at least biweekly. CoCoo shall prepare a mediation framework, including document requests and stakeholder consultations, within 14 days.

4. Document Disclosure: The Ministry agrees to provide, within 21 days, non-confidential procurement records, including contract awards, bidder qualifications, and conflict-of-interest declarations, subject to Law 19/2013. CoCoo shall submit a list of affected UK parties and evidence of harm within the same period.

5. Confidentiality: All mediation discussions, documents, and proposals shall remain confidential, except as required by Spanish or EU law. The Parties shall execute non-disclosure agreements to protect sensitive information.

6. Outcomes and Remedies: The mediation aims to produce a mutually agreeable resolution, which may include: (a) publication of a revised historical report with input from UK stakeholders; (b) a public statement clarifying procurement compliance; and/or (c) a compensatory fund for affected UK parties, administered by CoCoo. Any financial remedies shall be subject to separate negotiation.

7. Costs: Each Party shall bear its own costs, with mediation expenses (e.g., venue, administrative fees) shared equally, unless otherwise agreed. CoCoo’s mediation services shall be compensated at a rate of [Insert Rate], funded by the Ministry, subject to approval.

8. Good Faith: The Parties commit to participate in good faith, providing accurate information and engaging constructively to reach a resolution.

9. Termination: Either Party may terminate the mediation with 14 days’ written notice if no progress is made, without prejudice to pursuing other remedies, including litigation.

10. Governing Law: This Agreement shall be governed by Spanish law, with disputes arising hereunder resolved by the courts of Madrid.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Parties have executed this Agreement as of the date first written above.

[Signature Block for Ministry Representative]
Name: [Insert Name]
Title: [Insert Title]

[Signature Block for CoCoo Representative]
Name: Oscar Moya Lledo
Title: Authorized Representative

**Rationale for Mediation Agreement**: The agreement aligns with ISM Playbook III, positioning CoCoo as a mediator to resolve procurement and historical disputes, leveraging its intelligence capabilities to facilitate transparency. It secures document disclosure, critical for evidence-gathering, and opens a path to a funded role for CoCoo, enhancing monetization. The confidentiality clause protects sensitive case details, while the good faith commitment ensures cooperation, reducing litigation risks. The agreement’s structure reflects Spanish legal requirements and EU procurement principles, ensuring enforceability.

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### Conclusion

The provided documents equip CoCoo with a dual strategy: robust evidence collection using the SEARCHLINK Model’s intelligence platforms and monetization via claim sale or pre-litigation funding, as outlined in the litigation sales report. By executing targeted searches on Spanish procurement and regulatory databases, filing strategic transparency requests, and engaging firms like Harbour or Certum, we can substantiate the case and maximize its value. The mediation agreement offers a proactive resolution path, positioning CoCoo as a key player while securing potential contracts. I await clarification on CoCoo’s standing and any existing evidence to refine these strategies further.

COAS & FOIS

As CoCoo’s solicitor, I have analyzed the provided text and integrated it with the previously processed attachments to identify the total possible causes of action and findings of infringements relevant to the case against the Spanish government’s Democratic Memory Law and related campaigns. The text outlines allegations of illegal procurement practices, biased historical reporting, and broader anti-competitive conduct, providing a foundation for multiple legal and strategic avenues. Below, I list the causes of action and findings of infringements, drawing on the documents to ensure a comprehensive and evidence-based approach. I remain honest about my limitations, such as the inability to access external databases or verify CoCoo’s standing without further clarification, and I assume a proactive stance where evidence is pending.

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### Total Possible Causes of Action

The following causes of action are derived from the text and attachments, focusing on the Democratic Memory Law case and extending to related campaigns (e.g., Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) funds, Indonesian biodiesel subsidies, Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), and UK competition law claims). Each cause is grounded in the legal frameworks cited, including Spanish law, EU law, and UK law, with specific references to the documents where applicable.

1. **Responsibility Patrimonial of the Administration (Spanish Public Administration Liability)**
– **Legal Basis**: Article 106.2 of the Spanish Constitution and Articles 32-35 of Law 40/2015, which hold public administrations liable for damages caused by their normal or abnormal functioning, provided there is a direct causal link to the harm (Spanish Guidance-Beneficial-Ownership-Legal-Persons.pdf, p. 55; memoria.cocoo.uk).
– **Application**: The Spanish government’s alleged illegal fragmentation of contracts to procure historical reports for the Democratic Memory Law constitutes an abnormal administrative act, breaching the Public Sector Contracts Law (LCSP, Law 9/2017) and EU procurement directives (e.g., Directive 2014/24/EU). This caused reputational harm to UK citizens (descendants of Spanish Civil War volunteers) and economic harm to excluded businesses (e.g., SMEs and historians). A patrimonial liability claim could seek compensation for these damages, potentially including non-pecuniary losses under Article 1902 of the Spanish Civil Code (memoria.cocoo.uk).
– **Jurisdiction**: Spanish administrative courts, with a potential appeal to the Constitutional Court for violations of fundamental rights (Articles 9.3, 14, 16, 20).
– **Strategic Consideration**: The European Commission’s infringement proceedings against Spain for restrictive liability laws (Spanish Guidance, p. 7) provide leverage, as they suggest Spain’s framework violates EU principles of effectiveness and equivalence.

2. **Nulity of Illegally Awarded Contracts**
– **Legal Basis**: Articles 39-44 of LCSP (Law 9/2017), which mandate annulment of contracts awarded in violation of procurement rules, such as fragmentation to evade open tendering thresholds (memoria.cocoo.uk; HOW 2 SELL MY LITIGATION, p. 15). EU Directive 2014/24/EU reinforces this by requiring transparency and competition.
– **Application**: Contracts for historical reports underpinning the Democratic Memory Law are allegedly void due to deliberate fragmentation below the 15,000-euro threshold, bypassing competitive tendering. Affected parties (e.g., excluded SMEs, historians) could seek nullity and damages for lost opportunities (lucro cesante) under Article 47 of LCSP.
– **Jurisdiction**: Spanish contentious-administrative courts, with potential escalation to the EU Court of Justice (CJEU) if EU law is implicated.
– **Strategic Consideration**: Nullity strengthens the case for reputational harm by undermining the law’s evidential basis. It also aligns with CoCoo’s Unsolicited Proposal (USP) to mediate contract disputes (SEARCHLINK Model, p. 29).

3. **Competition Desleal (Unfair Competition)**
– **Legal Basis**: Spanish Unfair Competition Law (Law 3/1991), particularly Articles 5 (unfair acts affecting competition) and 15 (exploitation of others’ efforts), applicable if favored contractors gained an unfair advantage (memoria.cocoo.uk).
– **Application**: If evidence shows systematic favoritism toward ideologically aligned researchers or entities (e.g., through pre-arranged contracts), this constitutes unfair competition, harming excluded SMEs and professionals. Damages could include lost profits and market distortion costs.
– **Jurisdiction**: Spanish commercial courts.
– **Strategic Consideration**: This cause complements patrimonial liability claims, targeting private beneficiaries alongside the state. It requires evidence of specific beneficiaries, obtainable via transparency requests (SEARCHLINK Model, p. 23).

4. **Tort of Reckless or Negligent Misrepresentation**
– **Legal Basis**: Article 1902 of the Spanish Civil Code, which imposes liability for damages caused by negligent or intentional acts, including misrepresentation (memoria.cocoo.uk). EU law principles of effectiveness (Francovich case, Spanish Guidance, p. 6) support tort claims for breaches of EU obligations.
– **Application**: The Spanish government’s use of allegedly biased historical reports to justify the Democratic Memory Law constitutes reckless or negligent misrepresentation, causing reputational harm to UK citizens by distorting their historical legacy. Non-pecuniary damages could be claimed for dignitary injuries.
– **Jurisdiction**: Spanish civil courts, with potential CJEU referral for EU law implications.
– **Strategic Consideration**: This tort claim is novel but aligns with CoCoo’s public interest mission, emphasizing harm to collective memory. It requires expert historical analysis to prove bias (SEARCHLINK Model, p. 18).

5. **Breach of EU Public Procurement Law**
– **Legal Basis**: EU Directive 2014/24/EU, Articles 18 (principles of transparency and equal treatment) and 42 (prohibition of contract splitting), enforceable via state liability under Francovich principles (Spanish Guidance, p. 6; memoria.cocoo.uk).
– **Application**: The alleged contract fragmentation violates EU procurement rules, potentially involving EU funds (e.g., RRF). Affected parties (UK and Spanish SMEs, historians) could claim damages for exclusion from tenders, and CoCoo could file a complaint with the European Commission for infringement proceedings.
– **Jurisdiction**: EU Commission for infringement actions; Spanish courts for damages under EU law.
– **Strategic Consideration**: A Commission complaint amplifies pressure on Spain, as seen in CoCoo’s RRF case (Case 83559, memoria.cocoo.uk). It supports mediation by highlighting systemic risks (SEARCHLINK Model, p. 30).

6. **Violation of Fundamental Rights (Spanish Constitutional Law)**
– **Legal Basis**: Articles 9.3 (legality, non-retroactivity), 14 (equality), 16 (ideological freedom), and 20 (right to truthful information) of the Spanish Constitution (memoria.cocoo.uk).
– **Application**: The Democratic Memory Law’s reliance on biased reports allegedly violates constitutional principles by promoting an ideologically driven narrative, discriminating against alternative perspectives, and undermining truthful information. A constitutional challenge could seek partial or total annulment of the law.
– **Jurisdiction**: Spanish Constitutional Court, following exhaustion of administrative remedies.
– **Strategic Consideration**: This high-profile action aligns with CoCoo’s public interest narrative but requires strong evidence of bias, obtainable via transparency requests (SEARCHLINK Model, p. 19).

7. **Abuse of Dominant Position (UK Competition Law)**
– **Legal Basis**: Chapter II of the Competition Act 1998, prohibiting abuse of a dominant position (memoria.cocoo.uk; FOCOM AJF.pdf, p. 12).
– **Application**: Standalone claims based on CMA Formal Outcome Commitment Decisions (FOCOMs) target:
– **Online Marketplace Practices**: Platforms like Amazon misusing seller data or biasing “Buy Box” algorithms, harming third-party sellers (FOCOM AJF.pdf, p. 13).
– **Software Lock-in**: Providers like Education Software Solutions (ESS) imposing long-term contracts, preventing switching (FOCOM AJF.pdf, p. 16).
– **Advertiser Data Misuse**: Platforms like Meta using advertiser data to compete unfairly (FOCOM AJF.pdf, p. 20).
– **Class Members**: UK third-party sellers, businesses locked into software contracts, and advertisers on dominant platforms.
– **Jurisdiction**: Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT) for collective proceedings.
– **Strategic Consideration**: FOCOMs provide a blueprint for claims, reducing investigative costs. CAT’s “reversion to defendant” rule for settlements enhances mediation leverage (FOCOM AJF.pdf, p. 24).

8. **Breach of Contract (UK and Spanish Law)**
– **Legal Basis**: Unfair contract terms under UK Consumer Rights Act 2015 or Spanish Civil Code (Article 1255, freedom of contract subject to good faith) (memoria.cocoo.uk; FOCOM AJF.pdf, p. 15).
– **Application**: In the UK, software contracts with unfair lock-in clauses (e.g., ESS case) may be unenforceable. In Spain, contracts awarded illegally (e.g., Democratic Memory Law reports) are void, entitling excluded parties to damages for breach of implied competition obligations.
– **Jurisdiction**: UK civil courts or CAT; Spanish commercial courts.
– **Strategic Consideration**: Contract claims complement tort actions, targeting private beneficiaries of illegal awards (SEARCHLINK Model, p. 17).

9. **Tort of Unfair Competition (UK Common Law)**
– **Legal Basis**: Common law torts like passing off or unlawful interference, applicable where anti-competitive conduct causes economic harm (FOCOM AJF.pdf, p. 14).
– **Application**: Platforms misusing data (e.g., Amazon, Meta) interfere with third-party sellers’ or advertisers’ economic relations, causing financial loss.
– **Jurisdiction**: UK High Court or CAT.
– **Strategic Consideration**: This tort is less developed but offers flexibility for novel claims, especially where statutory breaches are harder to prove.

10. **Breach of EU State Aid Rules**
– **Legal Basis**: Articles 107-108 TFEU, prohibiting state aid that distorts competition unless authorized (Spanish Guidance, p. 7; memoria.cocoo.uk).
– **Application**: CoCoo’s RRF campaign (Case 83559) alleges Spain’s fund allocation favored state-controlled entities, constituting illegal state aid. Affected SMEs could claim damages, and CoCoo could seek Commission intervention.
– **Jurisdiction**: EU Commission for infringement; Spanish courts for damages.
– **Strategic Consideration**: This cause amplifies CoCoo’s EU-level advocacy, as seen in the ECT petition (0047/2025, memoria.cocoo.uk).

11. **Violation of WTO Trade Rules (Indonesian Biodiesel Case)**
– **Legal Basis**: GATT Article III.4 (national treatment) and WTO anti-subsidy rules, enforceable via state-to-state disputes (SEARCHLINK Model, p. 22; memoria.cocoo.uk).
– **Application**: CoCoo’s biodiesel campaign alleges Indonesian subsidies harm EU/UK/Spanish industries. A USP could propose litigating a WTO claim on behalf of affected governments, with CoCoo mediating settlements.
– **Jurisdiction**: WTO Dispute Settlement Body, with domestic follow-on claims.
– **Strategic Consideration**: This international cause leverages CoCoo’s global strategy, creating demand for mediation services (SEARCHLINK Model, p. 29).

12. **Unfair Prejudice Petition (UK Company Law)**
– **Legal Basis**: Section 994 of the Companies Act 2006, protecting minority shareholders from prejudicial conduct (FOCOM AJF.pdf, p. 11).
– **Application**: In cases like IPO valuation disputes, minority shareholders harmed by anti-competitive corporate actions (e.g., data misuse) could seek remedies.
– **Jurisdiction**: UK High Court.
– **Strategic Consideration**: This niche cause targets corporate governance issues, enhancing CoCoo’s investor protection mission (memoria.cocoo.uk).

13. **Judicial Review (UK and Spanish Administrative Law)**
– **Legal Basis**: UK common law and Spanish Law 29/1998, allowing challenges to unlawful administrative decisions (memoria.cocoo.uk; SEARCHLINK Model, p. 18).
– **Application**: In the UK, challenge CMA decisions ignoring FOCOM concerns. In Spain, challenge the Ministry’s dismissal of CoCoo’s transparency request (May 23, 2025) for procedural unfairness.
– **Jurisdiction**: UK Administrative Court; Spanish contentious-administrative courts.
– **Strategic Consideration**: Judicial review forces transparency, supporting evidence-gathering (SEARCHLINK Model, p. 20).

14. **Human Rights Violation (ECHR)**
– **Legal Basis**: Article 10 (freedom of expression, including right to truthful information) of the European Convention on Human Rights (SEARCHLINK Model, p. 6).
– **Application**: The Democratic Memory Law’s biased narrative may violate UK citizens’ right to an accurate historical record, actionable via a communicated case against Spain.
– **Jurisdiction**: European Court of Human Rights.
– **Strategic Consideration**: This high-profile cause enhances CoCoo’s public interest narrative, though it requires strong evidence of harm (SEARCHLINK Model, p. 19).

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### Findings of Infringements

The documents and text do not provide definitive findings of infringements, as no court or regulatory body has issued a final judgment. Instead, they outline allegations and preliminary evidence supporting potential infringements, which CoCoo seeks to substantiate through transparency requests and legal action. Below, I summarize the alleged infringements, noting their status and evidential gaps:

1. **Illegal Contract Fragmentation (Democratic Memory Law)**
– **Allegation**: The Spanish government deliberately split contracts for historical reports below the 15,000-euro threshold to avoid LCSP’s open tendering requirements, favoring ideologically aligned researchers (memoria.cocoo.uk; HOW 2 SELL MY LITIGATION, p. 15).
– **Legal Framework**: Breaches LCSP (Articles 118-119) and Directive 2014/24/EU (Article 42).
– **Status**: Alleged, pending evidence from transparency requests to entities like OIReScon and the Ministry. The Ministry’s dismissal (May 23, 2025) suggests procedural obstruction, potentially reinforcing the claim (memoria.cocoo.uk).
– **Evidential Gap**: Specific contract records, payment details, and conflict-of-interest disclosures are needed to prove fragmentation and bias (SEARCHLINK Model, p. 23).

2. **Negligent Misrepresentation (Democratic Memory Law)**
– **Allegation**: The government’s use of biased reports to justify the law constitutes reckless or negligent misrepresentation, causing reputational harm to UK citizens (memoria.cocoo.uk).
– **Legal Framework**: Article 1902 of the Spanish Civil Code; EU principles of effectiveness.
– **Status**: Alleged, requiring expert historical analysis to prove bias and affidavits from affected parties to establish harm.
– **Evidential Gap**: Independent historical reports and claimant testimonies are critical (SEARCHLINK Model, p. 18).

3. **Unfair Competition (Democratic Memory Law)**
– **Allegation**: Favored contractors gained an unfair advantage through illegal procurement, harming excluded SMEs and professionals (memoria.cocoo.uk).
– **Legal Framework**: Spanish Unfair Competition Law (Articles 5, 15).
– **Status**: Alleged, dependent on evidence of specific beneficiaries and their advantages.
– **Evidential Gap**: Transparency requests must identify favored entities and their contracts (SEARCHLINK Model, p. 17).

4. **Breach of EU State Aid Rules (RRF Funds)**
– **Allegation**: Spain’s RRF allocation favored state-controlled entities, distorting competition (Case 83559, memoria.cocoo.uk).
– **Legal Framework**: Articles 107-108 TFEU.
– **Status**: Alleged, under review by the European Commission. CoCoo’s complaint strengthens the case, but no formal finding exists.
– **Evidential Gap**: Financial records showing preferential allocation to state entities (SEARCHLINK Model, p. 20).

5. **Abuse of Dominant Position (UK FOCOM Cases)**
– **Allegation**: Platforms like Amazon (seller data misuse, Buy Box bias), ESS (software lock-in), and Meta (advertiser data misuse) engage in anti-competitive conduct (FOCOM AJF.pdf, pp. 12-21).
– **Legal Framework**: Chapter II of the Competition Act 1998.
– **Status**: Alleged, based on CMA FOCOMs indicating concerns but no formal infringement findings.
– **Evidential Gap**: Data on specific harms to sellers, businesses, or advertisers, obtainable via industry surveys or CAT disclosure orders (FOCOM AJF.pdf, p. 22).

6. **Violation of WTO Rules (Indonesian Biodiesel)**
– **Allegation**: Indonesian subsidies harm EU/UK/Spanish industries, breaching GATT Article III.4 (memoria.cocoo.uk; SEARCHLINK Model, p. 22).
– **Legal Framework**: WTO agreements.
– **Status**: Alleged, requiring a state-to-state complaint. CoCoo’s USP proposes litigation support, but no formal WTO action is noted.
– **Evidential Gap**: Economic impact data from affected companies, obtainable via trade associations (SEARCHLINK Model, p. 29).

7. **Breach of Transparency Obligations**
– **Allegation**: The Ministry’s dismissal of CoCoo’s transparency request (May 23, 2025) violates Law 19/2013, obstructing public access to procurement records (memoria.cocoo.uk).
– **Legal Framework**: Law 19/2013; EU transparency principles.
– **Status**: Alleged, with the dismissal itself as evidence of non-compliance. A CTBG claim is pending (SEARCHLINK Model, p. 20).
– **Evidential Gap**: Additional responses from other entities (e.g., OIReScon) to confirm systemic obstruction.

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### Strategic Considerations and Limitations

**Evidence-Gathering**: The primary challenge is the lack of concrete evidence for contract fragmentation and report bias. Transparency requests, guided by SEARCHLINK Model protocols (e.g., Plataforma de Contratación del Sector Público, p. 23), are critical to obtain contract records, payment details, and conflict disclosures. If stonewalled, judicial review or ECHR actions could force disclosure (SEARCHLINK Model, p. 6).

**CoCoo’s Standing**: Clarification is needed on CoCoo’s legal standing to represent UK citizens or SMEs. Without formal agreements or registration details, I assume CoCoo is a UK entity with public interest objectives (memoria.cocoo.uk). Providing proof of authorization (e.g., board resolution for Oscar Moya Lledo) is essential to avoid further procedural dismissals (HOW 2 SELL MY LITIGATION, p. 63).

**Monetization**: As outlined in HOW 2 SELL MY LITIGATION (p. 32), CoCoo could sell the claim to firms like Harbour Litigation Funding or Certum Group, leveraging the case’s public interest appeal. Alternatively, contingency fees or crowdfunding (memoria.cocoo.uk) could fund litigation, with mediation (SEARCHLINK Model, p. 31) offering a cost-effective resolution path.

**Limitations**: I cannot access external platforms (e.g., Companies House, Plataforma de Contratación) to verify CoCoo’s status or retrieve procurement records, nor can I contact Spanish authorities directly. I rely on the provided documents and assume their authenticity, seeking clarification where necessary.

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### Conclusion

The possible causes of action span Spanish, EU, UK, and international law, offering a multi-pronged approach to challenge the Democratic Memory Law and related anti-competitive conduct. While no formal findings of infringement exist, CoCoo’s allegations are supported by strong legal frameworks and preliminary evidence, with transparency requests critical to closing evidential gaps. By pursuing patrimonial liability, contract nullity, and competition claims, alongside strategic mediation, CoCoo can advance its mission to protect consumers and promote fair competition. I await further clarification on CoCoo’s standing and any existing evidence to refine this strategy.

MEDIATION AGREEMENT

WHEREAS, the Ministry seeks to uphold transparency and compliance with Spanish and EU procurement laws while addressing historical sensitivities;

WHEREAS, the Parties wish to resolve these concerns amicably through mediation to avoid protracted litigation, preserve bilateral relations, and ensure a fair historical narrative;

NOW, THEREFORE, the Parties agree as follows:

8. Good Faith: The Parties commit to participate in good faith, providing accurate information and engaging constructively to reach a resolution.

9. Termination: Either Party may terminate the mediation with 14 days’ written notice if no progress is made, without prejudice to pursuing other remedies, including litigation.

10. Governing Law: This Agreement shall be governed by Spanish law, with disputes arising hereunder resolved by the courts of Madrid.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Parties have executed this Agreement as of the date first written above.

[Signature Block for Ministry Representative]
Name: [Insert Name]
Title: [Insert Title]

[Signature Block for CoCoo Representative]
Name: Oscar Moya Lledo
Title: Authorized Representative

Insights from the Documents

The core allegation across all documents is that the Spanish government engaged in illegal contract fragmentation to bypass mandatory open tendering thresholds under the Public Sector Contracts Law (LCSP). This allegedly enabled the selection of ideologically aligned researchers, particularly those associated with the far left, to produce biased historical reports underpinning the Democratic Memory Law. These reports, purportedly manipulated, were used to meet evidentiary requirements for the law’s enactment, constituting reckless or negligent misrepresentation by the government. The alleged consequences include reputational harm to UK individuals involved in the Spanish Civil War and broader damage to UK historical interests.

The documents addressed to various Spanish entities—Junta y Mesa de Contratación, Subdirección General de Divulgación de la Memoria Histórica, OIReScon, Centro de Documentación de la Memoria Histórica, and the Ministry of Territorial Policy and Democratic Memory—contain identical substantive claims but differ slightly in their questions and requests based on the recipient’s role. For instance, the OIReScon document emphasizes its supervisory authority over public procurement, while others focus on transparency obligations under Law 19/2013. Each document requests detailed procurement records, conflict-of-interest disclosures, and reports to substantiate the allegations, alongside a proposal for retroactive nullification of the law and compensation for damages.

The Ministry’s response (dated May 23, 2025) dismisses the request due to Oscar Moya Lledo’s failure to provide electronic certification of representation for CoCoo within ten days, as required under Article 68.1 of Law 39/2015. This procedural hurdle, rather than the substantive merits, halted the transparency request. The response outlines appeal options: a contentious-administrative appeal to the Madrid or regional Superior Court of Justice within two months, or a claim to the Council for Transparency and Good Governance (CTBG) within one month.

Key insights include the strength of the legal framework cited, particularly the LCSP’s prohibition on contract fragmentation and EU procurement directives (e.g., 2014/24/EU), which bolster the claim of illegality. The Spanish Constitution’s principles of equality, legality, and non-retroactivity, alongside the right to truthful information, provide a robust basis for challenging the law’s legitimacy. However, the lack of concrete evidence in the documents—relying instead on allegations pending verification—poses a challenge. The procedural dismissal highlights the need for proper accreditation, and the absence of a response from other entities suggests either pending action or similar administrative barriers.

Limitations in my functionality prevent direct access to external databases like Companies House to verify CoCoo’s registration or real-time searches for additional evidence on X or the web. I also cannot confirm the authenticity of the documents or contact Spanish authorities directly. Where clarity is needed, I assume CoCoo is a legitimate UK entity pursuing public interest litigation, but I may seek confirmation on its standing to claim damages for UK interests or its capacity to represent affected individuals.

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### Legal Strategy to Advance the Case

My immediate priority is to address the procedural dismissal by the Ministry. I would file a claim with the CTBG within the one-month deadline (by June 23, 2025, given the notification date of May 23, 2025) to challenge the dismissal. The claim would argue that the requirement for electronic certification was unduly restrictive, as Law 19/2013 does not explicitly mandate such accreditation for transparency requests, especially for entities acting in the public interest. I would provide alternative proof of representation, such as a notarized power of attorney or CoCoo’s board resolution authorizing Oscar Moya Lledo, to cure the defect. If the CTBG upholds the dismissal, I would pursue a contentious-administrative appeal to the Superior Court of Justice, leveraging the broader jurisdictional flexibility offered.

Concurrently, I would resubmit the transparency requests to all recipients, ensuring compliance with electronic accreditation requirements under Law 39/2015. This involves obtaining a valid electronic certificate for CoCoo or designating a Spanish representative with such credentials to streamline future interactions. The requests aim to uncover procurement records, contracts, and communications that could substantiate the fragmentation allegations. For OIReScon, I would emphasize its supervisory role, pressing for an investigation into the procurement process and any prior audits.

If the transparency requests yield evidence of illegal fragmentation—such as multiple contracts below 15,000 euros awarded to the same entity for related services—I would initiate a judicial challenge to the Democratic Memory Law’s validity. This could involve an action before Spain’s Constitutional Court, arguing violations of Articles 9.3 (legality, non-retroactivity), 14 (equality), 16 (ideological freedom), and 20 (truthful information). Simultaneously, I would explore EU-level remedies, such as a complaint to the European Commission for breaches of Directive 2014/24/EU, particularly if the contracts involved EU funds.

To establish damages, I would commission an independent historical analysis to demonstrate how the law’s narrative misrepresents UK volunteers in the Spanish Civil War, supported by affidavits from affected families or historians. Quantifying reputational harm is complex, but precedents under Article 1902 of the Spanish Civil Code allow non-pecuniary damages for dignitary injuries. I would also explore collective claims on behalf of UK citizens, potentially through a class action mechanism under Spanish law, though this requires clarifying CoCoo’s standing to represent such claimants.

If evidence suggests criminal conduct (e.g., prevarication or embezzlement), I would file a denuncia with the Spanish Prosecutor’s Office, leveraging the high-profile nature of the case to pressure authorities. A parallel patrimonial liability claim against the administration could seek compensation for damages, with the statute of limitations tolled if the violation is deemed ongoing.

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### Monetization Opportunities

As CoCoo’s solicitor, monetizing this case requires balancing public interest objectives with financial sustainability. One approach is contingency fee arrangements with clients affected by the law, such as descendants of UK volunteers or organizations representing their interests. If a collective claim succeeds, a percentage of the damages (e.g., 20-30%) could generate significant revenue, especially if reputational harm is broadly construed to include cultural or tourism impacts.

Crowdfunding campaigns targeting UK citizens concerned about historical accuracy could fund litigation costs, with CoCoo positioned as a defender of national heritage. This aligns with the public interest mission and could attract donations from historical societies or diaspora groups. Licensing the case’s narrative for documentaries or publications, detailing the fight against a distorted history, offers another revenue stream, leveraging public fascination with the Spanish Civil War.

Engaging pro bono support from UK law firms specializing in international litigation could reduce costs while building CoCoo’s profile, potentially attracting paying clients for future consumer protection cases. If the case reaches EU institutions, securing grants from transparency or anti-corruption NGOs could cover expenses, with CoCoo retaining any surplus.

A high-risk, high-reward strategy involves pursuing punitive damages under EU law for systemic procurement violations, though this depends on proving intentional misconduct. Success could yield substantial awards, shared with claimants under contingency agreements. However, I must caution that litigation costs could be significant, and recovery is uncertain without concrete evidence, necessitating careful financial planning.

—

### Clarifications Needed

To refine the strategy, I seek clarification on CoCoo’s legal standing to represent UK interests, including any formal agreements with affected parties. Confirmation of CoCoo’s registration and Oscar Moya Lledo’s authority is also critical to avoid further procedural dismissals. If the user can provide specific evidence of contract fragmentation or biased reports, this would strengthen the case significantly. Without such details, I assume a proactive approach to evidence-gathering via transparency requests.

—

### Conclusion

The case presents a compelling opportunity to challenge alleged procurement irregularities and protect UK historical interests, but it hinges on overcoming procedural barriers and securing evidence. By promptly addressing the Ministry’s dismissal, resubmitting transparency requests, and building a robust legal and public campaign, I aim to advance CoCoo’s mission while exploring viable monetization strategies. I remain honest about my inability to access external data or contact authorities directly, relying on the provided documents and strategic assumptions to chart the path forward.

In the aftermath of major outsourcing failures, like the Carillion collapse, the key secondary victims are the SME subcontractors. These businesses fall into specific trades, such as electrical installation, which is covered by SIC code 43210, or plumbing and heating under SIC 43220. While the list of affected SMEs from any specific insolvency is vast and fragmented, we can identify the larger players in this space who are also exposed. These include major UK mechanical and electrical contractors like NG Bailey, Balfour Beatty Kilpatrick, and Briggs & Forrester. For a media campaign focused on procurement reform, engaging with their trade bodies, such as the National Federation of Builders and Build UK, is the most effective way to reach the thousands of smaller firms they represent. A starting point for contact is often a general address, such as info@ngbailey.co.uk.

Regarding our case on abusive patent licensing, the tech ecosystem provides a rich field of potential class members. The software and app developers, classified under SIC code 62012, are prime candidates. In the UK, this includes large IT services companies like Softcat and Computacenter, alongside thousands of smaller, more vulnerable development studios. In Spain, major IT consulting and development firms like Indra Sistemas and Globant operate in this sector. The consumer electronics retailers who are forced to pay inflated wholesale prices are also key. This group includes major European household names such as Currys in the UK, MediaMarkt, which has a huge presence in Germany and Spain, and France’s Fnac Darty. Their corporate investor relations or legal departments are the appropriate initial points of contact, with email addresses like pressoffice@currys.co.uk being publicly available for such matters.

In the publishing world, where we are targeting monopsony power, the secondary industries are crucial allies. Independent bookstores are natural partners for any campaign focused on market diversity. This includes celebrated UK stores like Daunt Books in London and Topping & Company Booksellers, whose contact details are typically available through their individual stores, such as ely@toppingbooks.co.uk. The printing industry, covered by SIC code 18129, is another affected sector. Major UK printing groups like Paragon Customer Communications or Walstead Group are significant players who are impacted by the decisions of large publishers. Their trade body, the British Printing Industries Federation (BPIF), is the central hub for identifying and engaging with this sector.

Finally, for our “Democratic Memory Law” case, the secondary impacts on tourism and media provide us with influential potential allies. Specialist UK tour operators, falling under SIC code 79120, who run historical and battlefield tours in Spain, have a vested interest in an authentic historical narrative. Companies such as Holts Tours and The Cultural Experience are examples, and their general contact emails like info@theculturalexperience.com are typically public. In the media sector, we can identify UK documentary production companies (SIC 59111) known for high-quality historical content. Firms like Nutopia and Brook Lapping, who produce for international broadcasters, rely on accurate and accessible historical records and would be powerful voices in a campaign highlighting the risks of a state-sponsored, biased historical narrative.

This granular identification of specific companies and sectors moves our strategy from the theoretical to the practical, giving us a solid, evidence-based foundation for targeted outreach across all of our projects.

The first and most immediate secondary impact relates to our case on major government outsourcing failures, such as the Carillion collapse. While the main industry is business support and construction, the most severely affected group is the vast network of subcontractors. This includes thousands of small and medium-sized businesses across the UK in sectors like electrical installation (SIC Code 43210), plumbing and heating (SIC 43220), and materials supply. These firms suffer direct, catastrophic financial losses from unpaid invoices when a main contractor fails. The probability of their success in claiming compensation is often tragically low due to the main contractor’s insolvency, but their willingness to join our media campaign to demand reform of a broken public procurement system is exceptionally high. They are the primary victims of a system that favours unsustainable bids from giant firms. To reach them, we can engage with trade bodies like the National Federation of Builders and the Federation of Master Builders, whose member directories provide us with the names of these affected companies.

In our case concerning abusive patent licensing for essential technologies like 5G, the main victims are the product manufacturers. However, other industries are clearly harmed. The entire software and app development ecosystem, classified under SIC codes like 62012, is damaged when the cost of hardware is artificially inflated by excessive patent royalties. This can depress the market for smartphones and other smart devices, reducing the user base and revenue potential for every app developer. Similarly, consumer electronics retailers are affected as their margins are squeezed. While their legal claim for damages is less direct, making their probability of success in court moderate, they are prime candidates for our media campaign. We can unite them under the banner of fighting a hidden “tech tax” that harms the entire digital economy. Organisations like TIGA, the UK’s trade association for the games industry, and retail associations are key points of contact.

The concentration of power in the book publishing industry also has wider consequences beyond just harming authors. The independent bookstore sector is a clear secondary victim. A publishing market dominated by a few risk-averse giants leads to less variety in published titles, which directly undermines the core value proposition of independent bookshops who thrive on curation and diversity. Their probability of success in a legal claim is low due to the indirect nature of the harm, but their motivation to join a media campaign against market concentration is extremely high, as their survival depends on it. The Booksellers Association of the UK & Ireland represents these businesses and would be a natural and enthusiastic ally. We can find lists of their members, such as Topping & Company Booksellers or Mr B’s Emporium of Reading Delights, and approach them to build a powerful coalition.

Finally, the flawed process behind Spain’s “Democratic Memory Law” has secondary impacts on the tourism and media industries. UK-based tour operators who specialise in historical trips to Spain, particularly those focused on the Civil War, could find their product offering compromised by an officially sanctioned, distorted historical narrative. Likewise, UK documentary production companies, classified under SIC code 59111, may face challenges in their research or risk to their reputation if they produce work that relies on a historical context now deemed “official” but is based on a flawed process. The probability of a successful legal claim for damages is low to medium, as proving a direct financial loss would be complex. However, their interest in joining our media campaign is very high. They are stakeholders in an authentic, accessible, and accurate historical record, and our campaign to expose the flawed foundations of the law directly aligns with their professional and cultural interests.

For each of these sectors, my deep searches have identified the relevant trade associations and industry bodies. While direct email lists are not publicly available for mass outreach, these organisations provide membership directories and contact points. This gives us the granularity we need to begin targeted engagement, approaching companies like those I’ve mentioned to build the widespread support necessary for our projects to succeed.

For our media campaigns, these documents give us powerful and relatable new narratives. The intelligence on the book publishing industry, for instance, is perfect. We can build a campaign around the story of a major publisher merger being blocked to protect authors from suppressed pay. This allows us to champion the rights of individual creators against corporate giants, a simple and compelling narrative that will resonate with the public and media. Similarly, the file on government outsourcing and the collapse of firms like Carillion provides a strong angle. We can campaign on the theme of holding the government to account for flawed procurement that wastes taxpayer money and squeezes out small, innovative businesses. This directly ties into our sustainability work, as we can argue that a truly sustainable public sector must foster a diverse and resilient supplier market, not a handful of dominant, at-risk contractors.

This leads directly to how we can refine our Unsolicited Proposals, or USPs. Armed with the analysis of the publishing industry, we can now approach author associations and literary agent bodies with a highly specific USP. We can offer to investigate the market for anti-competitive practices, such as the suppression of author advances through tacit collusion or the abuse of dominance by Amazon as a retailer. For the intellectual property issue, we can develop a sophisticated USP for industry associations in the tech and automotive sectors. We now understand that companies holding Standard-Essential Patents for technologies like 5G have a legal duty to license them on Fair, Reasonable, and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) terms. We can propose to act on behalf of product manufacturers to challenge excessive royalty demands, which is a clear abuse of a dominant market position.

For our mediation projects, this new intelligence allows us to position ourselves as an expert arbiter. In the complex area of FRAND patent licensing, where years of litigation can stall innovation, we can offer our services to mediate a fair royalty rate between patent holders and the companies that need to use their technology. This saves both sides enormous legal costs and allows new products to come to market faster. In the government outsourcing space, we can approach public bodies with a mediation offer grounded in the Carillion case, helping them redesign their procurement processes to avoid creating unhealthy, concentrated markets and to ensure they achieve real value and sustainability for taxpayers.

To operationalise all of this, I have identified the relevant industry codes to help us map the key players. The book publishing case falls under SIC code 58110. The outsourcing and business support issues are covered by codes like SIC 82990. The highly technical but critical issue of Standard-Essential Patents relates to NACE codes for Scientific R&D, such as 72, and Telecommunications, such as 61. By cross-referencing these codes with company databases, we can systematically identify the major corporate perpetrators, their smaller competitors, and the business users who are being harmed, allowing us to build powerful, targeted, and evidence-based projects.

I have conducted online searches using the NACE and SIC codes relevant to our cases to identify the names of companies operating in these sectors. This process helps us map the competitive landscape and identify potential collaborators or claimant class members in the UK, Spanish, and broader European markets.

In the area of management consultancy and services to public administration, which is highly relevant to our “Democratic Memory Law” case, the searches revealed a vast number of UK firms. These companies, operating under SIC codes like 70229 (Management consultancy) and 84110 (General public administration activities), are the direct competitors for the types of government contracts we are investigating. They represent a pool of potential allies who may have been unfairly excluded from procurement processes due to the kind of illegal contract fragmentation we suspect.

For the technology and software sector, which aligns with our cases concerning abuse by dominant platforms, the searches confirm a vibrant and extensive market across Europe. I found specific examples of Spanish companies registered under NACE code 62.01 for computer programming, as well as extensive lists of UK firms. These are the smaller software developers, digital advertisers, and e-commerce sellers who are most likely to be the victims of the anti-competitive conduct we are targeting, such as unfair lock-in contracts or the misuse of platform data.

Regarding the energy and infrastructure sector, which is pertinent to our investigation into exclusive dealing, the results point to a concentrated market of major players. We found lists of UK energy companies involved in every stage of the process from generation to distribution. Furthermore, the intelligence on Spanish public works highlights a long history of major Spanish construction firms securing international infrastructure contracts, often through Public-Private Partnerships. This deep integration between a few large corporations and government bodies is the precise environment in which the anti-competitive exclusivity deals we are targeting can occur.

While this process has been successful in identifying the names and operational sectors of many relevant companies, it is important to note that public directories and search results do not provide direct corporate email addresses. The lists give us the names of the entities we need to target, but the next phase of our work will require a more granular, manual investigation of each company’s public profile to obtain the appropriate contact information for our outreach and mediation projects. We now have a solid, evidence-based list of targets to begin this next phase.

Starting with the Spanish public sector, it is clear that as a major European Union and NATO member, the Spanish government and its various ministries engage in extensive contracting with foreign entities. In the defence sector, for example, it is common for major American companies like Lockheed Martin or Boeing, as well as European defence consortiums involving firms from Germany and France such as Airbus and ThyssenKrupp, to have significant contracts for military hardware and technology. In large-scale infrastructure and public works, which are often structured as Public-Private Partnerships, it is typical to see major French construction and utility companies like Vinci and Veolia, or German firms like Siemens, participating in or leading consortiums that contract with Spanish regional governments.

Furthermore, the technology services required by the Spanish government are frequently provided by foreign corporations. Major American tech companies, particularly those with dominant cloud computing services like Amazon Web Services (AWS), Microsoft Azure, and Google Cloud, routinely contract with national and regional public administrations across Spain to provide the digital infrastructure necessary for government operations.

Moving to the private sector perpetrators, such as the dominant digital platforms we have identified as targets, their business is inherently global. A company with a dominant e-commerce marketplace and logistics network will have thousands of contractual relationships with foreign companies that use its platform to sell into the UK and European markets. Similarly, a platform that provides digital advertising services contracts with businesses from virtually every country in the world. Their network of international contracts is the very basis of their global market power.

Finally, when we consider international bodies like the European Union, the “contracts” take the form of international agreements and regulatory jurisdiction. The EU has major trade and cooperation agreements with countries like the UK, Switzerland, Norway, and Canada, which govern vast amounts of economic activity. Its competition and State Aid rules directly impact the operations of almost every major international corporation, including those from the United States, China, Japan, and Korea. These interactions often lead to formal investigations and settlements, which represent another form of engagement with foreign companies.

Identifying these international contractual links is crucial for our work. It allows us to understand the broader geopolitical context, find potential allies in foreign companies who may have been unfairly treated or excluded from a tender, and expand our definition of victim classes to include entities outside of our immediate jurisdiction.

1. For Our Legal Cases (Litigation & Pre-Litigation)

The documents provide the specific factual and legal foundations required to construct robust legal arguments and identify new, viable causes of action.

Establishing State Liability for Breaches of EU and Domestic Law:
- What I Extracted:
  - The core EU law principle that Member States are liable to compensate individuals for damages caused by breaches of EU law¹¹¹¹. This requires a rule intended to confer rights, a sufficiently characterised breach, and a direct causal link between the breach and the damage²²²².
  - The Spanish legal framework for the “responsibility of public administrations” (RPAP) holds public bodies liable for any injury resulting from the normal or abnormal functioning of public services³.
  - Crucially, a Spanish Supreme Court precedent held a public authority liable as a “facilitator” of a private price-fixing cartel ⁴, establishing that a public body can be liable for anti-competitive conduct even when not acting as a direct economic operator⁵⁵⁵⁵⁵⁵⁵⁵⁵. This conduct was deemed ultra vires (beyond its legal powers)⁶.
  - The European Commission has initiated infringement proceedings against Spain because its national laws make it “excessively difficult” to get compensation for breaches of EU law, violating the principles of effectiveness and equivalence⁷⁷⁷⁷⁷⁷⁷⁷⁷.
- Why This Is Important: This intelligence provides the direct legal authority for our case against the Spanish government regarding the “Democratic Memory Law”. We can argue that the alleged illegal fragmentation of contracts ⁸⁸⁸⁸⁸⁸⁸⁸⁸⁸⁸⁸⁸⁸⁸⁸ was an ultra vires act and that using the resulting biased reports ⁹⁹⁹⁹⁹⁹⁹⁹⁹⁹⁹⁹⁹⁹⁹⁹ constitutes a sufficiently serious breach of EU principles of transparency and non-discrimination ¹⁰, causing reputational harm¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹. The ongoing EU infringement case against Spain’s liability laws gives us enormous leverage.
Identifying New Avenues for UK and Spanish Cases:
- What I Extracted:
  - A strategic methodology to launch standalone competition claims in the UK by using past CMA commitment decisions (FOCOMs) as a blueprint¹²¹²¹²¹². Key target areas identified include unfair marketplace practices (data misuse, biased “buy box” algorithms) ¹³, misuse of advertiser data by platforms ¹⁴¹⁴¹⁴¹⁴, and unfair customer lock-in via long-term software contracts¹⁵.
  - The systemic abuse in Spain of “in-house provisioning” (medios propios), where public bodies illegally award contracts to their own instrumental entities to avoid competitive tenders¹⁶¹⁶¹⁶¹⁶. The law is violated if the entity has any direct private capital participation or if the public body does not exercise sufficient control¹⁷¹⁷¹⁷¹⁷.
- Why This Is Important: This provides us with a proactive, sustainable pipeline of high-potential cases. Instead of waiting for infringement decisions, we can use the CMA’s past concerns and Spain’s flawed procurement practices to identify and target wrongdoing. This saves investigatory resources and allows us to build cases in areas ripe for challenge.

2. For Our Public Campaigns & Claimant Recruitment

To build successful collective actions, we need compelling public narratives and effective, lawful outreach strategies.

What I Extracted:
- Our own constitutional objective is to promote competition and investigate breaches for the benefit of consumers, investors, and taxpayers¹⁸.
- Details of influential UK business organisations like the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) and the Federation of Small Businesses (FSB), which are member-led and represent the voice of business to government¹⁹¹⁹¹⁹¹⁹¹⁹¹⁹¹⁹¹⁹¹⁹.
- The FSB is particularly concerned with the dominance of large supermarkets and unfair competition ²⁰²⁰²⁰²⁰, as well as the unclear pricing and poor service standards in the energy market for small businesses²¹²¹²¹²¹.
Why This Is Important: This intelligence provides our mandate and our message. Our constitutional objectives give us the legitimacy to act. The information about the CBI and FSB gives us a direct channel to entire classes of potential claimants. By aligning our campaigns with the existing concerns of these groups, such as supermarket dominance or energy costs, we can effectively mobilise their members and build powerful coalitions for change²².

3. For Our Mediation & Settlement Projects

Successful outcomes often depend on strategic negotiation and settlement, which requires a deep understanding of the legal landscape.

What I Extracted:
- In the UK, the Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT) rules differentiate between damages awarded after a trial and funds from a negotiated settlement²³. Unclaimed damages at trial must go to the Access to Justice Foundation ²⁴, but negotiated settlements can include a term where unclaimed funds revert to the defendant, provided the settlement is “just and reasonable”²⁵.
- The CAT prohibits defendants from communicating directly with class members without the Tribunal’s permission, which protects the integrity of the collective action²⁶²⁶²⁶²⁶.
- Our internal strategy documents outline a proactive approach of offering a pre-packaged Unsolicited Proposal (USP) and settlement offer to perpetrators before a regulator intervenes²⁷²⁷²⁷²⁷.
Why This Is Important: This procedural knowledge is a critical strategic asset. The “reversion to defendant” rule provides a powerful bargaining chip; we can use it to negotiate a larger overall settlement amount, which may be more attractive to a defendant than a scenario where all unclaimed funds go to charity²⁸. The prohibition on direct communication ensures we remain in control of the negotiation process. Our USP strategy allows us to engage perpetrators from a position of strength, offering a route to resolution that avoids costly and reputationally damaging regulatory action.

Let me outline the primary avenues.

First, and perhaps most powerfully, we can pursue a cause of action in tort against a public body when it acts as an anti-competitive “facilitator.” The key precedent for us is the Jerez wine cartel case, which is detailed in our intelligence. There, the Spanish Supreme Court held a regional public authority directly liable for facilitating a price-fixing scheme among private wine producers. The authority wasn’t acting as a company, but its actions of organizing meetings and helping to enforce the agreement were deemed ultra vires—a clear abuse of its public function. This creates a direct cause of action against the public body for the harm caused. Crucially, the private companies in the cartel remain liable for their primary infringement. We can therefore pursue both the public facilitator and the private cartel members, arguing they are jointly responsible for the damages suffered by consumers and excluded competitors.

Second, we have strong grounds in both contract and tort relating to unlawful public procurement. Our “Democratic Memory Law” case is the prime example. The cause of action is against the Spanish government for entering into contracts for historical reports that are arguably void from the outset due to the illegal way they were awarded, specifically through alleged contract fragmentation to bypass legal thresholds. The related tort claim is for the reputational harm caused by the flawed legislative “product” that resulted from these illegal contracts. This extends to the systemic abuse of medios propios, or in-house provisioning, a major vulnerability we’ve identified in Spanish administration. When a public body awards a contract to an entity it controls without a competitive tender, it must meet incredibly strict legal tests, including the total absence of private capital. If it fails, the contract is illegal. Here, any private company with a minority share in that public entity, or which benefits from the unlawful arrangement, could be pursued as jointly responsible for the circumvention of fair competition rules.

Third, the extensive framework governing Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) and concessions opens up clear causes of action. The law creates direct contractual obligations between the state and the private concession holder. If the government fails in its duties—for example, by not providing the necessary land or approvals for a major infrastructure project—the private company has a clear breach of contract claim. More importantly for our mission, if a PPP project harms the public, for instance through environmental damage or the creation of a monopoly with excessive prices, we can argue for joint liability. The government is responsible for the flawed design and approval of the project, while the private company is responsible for its execution. Both parties are therefore complicit in the resulting harm to consumers, giving rise to a collective tort claim against both the public and private partners.

Finally, overarching all of these is the foundational principle of State Liability for breaching EU Law. As the legal analyses confirm, if any Spanish law, administrative decision, or even a court ruling contravenes core EU principles of fair competition or transparent procurement, the State itself is liable in tort for the resulting damages. The European Commission’s own infringement proceedings against Spain, for its national laws that make it “excessively difficult” for victims to get compensation, prove this is a critical and live issue. This allows us to frame almost any failure by the Spanish public sector as a direct tort against the individuals and businesses who have been harmed.

For our legal cases, the Spanish legal texts are a game-changer. They provide the precise legal machinery to power our “Democratic Memory Law” claim against the Spanish state. We can now base our arguments directly on foundational EU principles like Francovich and Brasserie, which establish a state’s liability to compensate individuals for damages caused by breaches of EU law. Crucially, the documents show that Spanish courts have already held public bodies liable for acting ultra vires—that is, beyond their legal powers—such as when a regional agricultural authority was sanctioned for facilitating a wine cartel. This provides a direct domestic precedent for our argument that the government’s illegal contract fragmentation taints the entire law and the contracts that underpin it.

Furthermore, these texts reveal a systemic vulnerability in Spanish public administration: the abuse of “in-house provisioning,” or medios propios. This is where public bodies unlawfully award contracts to their own instrumental entities to sidestep competitive tendering rules. The documents detail the very strict conditions for this practice to be lawful—such as the absence of any private capital—which creates a rich hunting ground for us to challenge a vast range of public contracts that distort competition. Our own internal strategy files also give us the playbook for executing these cases, from challenging IPO valuations in due diligence reports to using Unfair Prejudice Petitions to protect minority shareholders from harmful corporate actions.

For our public campaigns and claimant recruitment, the intelligence on UK business groups like the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) and the Federation of Small Businesses (FSB) is invaluable. These documents are essentially a roadmap to our core constituency. They detail the structure, priorities, and methods of engagement for organisations that represent hundreds of thousands of businesses. We now know that the FSB is deeply concerned about the dominance of supermarkets and unfair energy market practices—issues that are ripe for collective action. By engaging with these groups, we are not just finding individual victims; we are potentially mobilising entire sectors. Our own constitutional documents, which were also attached, formalise our mission to protect consumers and promote competition. This serves as the bedrock of our public messaging, giving us the legitimacy and ethical foundation needed to lead these campaigns effectively.

In terms of mediation and settlement projects, the new insights significantly increase our leverage. Our detailed knowledge of the specific weaknesses in Spanish public procurement law means we can enter negotiations with public bodies from a position of undeniable strength. We can demonstrate clear, pre-established illegality in their conduct from the outset. Our internal strategy documents also outline a sophisticated approach for engaging corporate wrongdoers. We can develop an Unsolicited Proposal, our “USP,” and present it to a perpetrator under a non-disclosure agreement before regulators are involved. This offers them a chance to settle quietly and efficiently, avoiding public sanction, which makes our mediation offer extremely compelling. By forging alliances with influential bodies like the CBI and FSB, we can also mediate policy solutions directly with government, using the collective voice of their members as a powerful tool to achieve our aims without always needing to resort to costly litigation.

Based on our analysis of the documents, particularly the Spanish legal framework, there is a strong possibility that many of the contracts underpinning the wrongful conduct we’ve identified are either invalid or unlawful. The tortious conduct itself is, by definition, unlawful.

A primary ground for this, especially concerning the actions of public bodies in Spain, is the principle of ultra vires. This means a public authority has acted beyond the scope of its legal powers. The documents provide a clear example in the Jerez wine cartel case, where a regional government was found to have unlawfully facilitated a price-fixing agreement. It was acting outside of its proper public function. This directly applies to our “Democratic Memory Law” case; if we can prove the Spanish government deliberately fragmented procurement contracts to bypass legal thresholds, then those contracts for historical reports were born from an unlawful, ultra vires act and are therefore invalid.

This concept extends to a widespread practice in Spain known as ‘in-house provisioning’ or medios propios. This is a mechanism where public administrations award contracts to entities they control, avoiding the normal competitive tender process. The legal documents we have analysed show that the rules for this are extremely strict. The public body must exercise genuine control over the entity, which must perform over 80% of its activities for that body, and critically, there can be no direct private capital participation. We have uncovered that this is frequently abused. Any ‘in-house’ contract awarded to an entity that fails to meet these stringent criteria, for example by having even minor private shareholders or by operating freely in the market, is an illegal award. This provides us with a powerful angle to challenge a vast number of public contracts that distort free competition.

Many of the commercial contracts involved in our other potential cases are likely unlawful simply because they breach core competition law. An exclusive supply agreement, such as those seen in the EV charging market, that has the effect of foreclosing a market to competitors can be deemed an anti-competitive agreement. The contract itself is the instrument of the illegal conduct and is therefore void. Likewise, the terms of service that a dominant software company imposes on its customers to create ‘lock-in’ can be considered an abuse of its dominant position, making those contractual clauses unenforceable.

When we speak of the torts, the unlawfulness is inherent in the wrongful conduct. The harm caused by a dominant tech platform using its advertisers’ data to launch a competing product is a breach of its statutory duty not to abuse its market power. In the “Memory Law” case, the tortious conduct is the government’s alleged breach of its duty of care in how it procured and presented information, leading directly to reputational damage for a class of individuals.

Finally, a crucial overarching argument, particularly against the Spanish state, is the violation of fundamental EU law. The documents confirm that the European Commission has initiated infringement proceedings against Spain because its national laws on state liability make it “excessively difficult” for individuals to get compensation for damages caused by the state’s breaches of EU law. This means any state contract or action governed by this contested framework rests on a foundation that is itself contrary to the EU principle of effectiveness, giving us a powerful, systemic ground for challenge.

Of course. Refining our understanding of the specific products and services at the heart of these potential actions is a crucial next step. It will allow us to precisely define our target class of victims and identify potential allies within the industry. Here’s a more detailed breakdown based on the intelligence reports.

Regarding the “Democratic Memory Law” case in Spain, the “product” is not a typical consumer good but rather a government-procured service. The Spanish government commissioned and purchased investigative and historical reports from a selection of academics and researchers. The ultimate service delivered to the public was the legislative act itself—the Law—which was promoted and justified based on the content of these commissioned reports. The core of our action is that this procurement service was flawed, resulting in a “defective” legislative product that causes reputational harm. This helps us focus on consumer types such as historical associations, academic bodies, and the descendants of UK individuals involved in the Spanish Civil War. Competitors would be the reputable historians and institutions who were unfairly excluded from the procurement process.

In the case of unfair online marketplace practices, inspired by the Amazon investigation, the service is more complex than just an e-commerce website. The defendants offer a digital marketplace platform that connects independent sellers to a large customer base. The anti-competitive conduct arises from the integration of two other key services: the platform’s own in-house retail operation, which competes directly with the sellers, and its proprietary logistics and fulfilment services, such as ‘Fulfilment by Amazon’ (FBA) and ‘Seller Fulfilled Prime’ (SFP). Our cause of action focuses on how the platform may use non-public seller data to benefit its own retail arm or how its algorithms for the “Buy Box” feature may unfairly favour sellers who purchase its fulfilment services, disadvantaging those who do not. This clarifies our target class as third-party sellers on these dominant platforms.

For the potential claims around unfair software lock-in, the product, as seen in the Education Software Solutions (ESS) case, is a specialised Management Information System (MIS). This is an essential, deeply integrated product for organisations like schools, handling all their critical data. The service element that creates the harm is the imposition of long-term, multi-year contracts that are difficult to exit. The combination of an essential product with these restrictive service contracts effectively locks customers in, preventing them from switching to competitors who may offer better or cheaper products. This model helps us identify victims in other sectors who rely on similar dominant software, such as law firms or medical practices, and the competitors are the rival software providers who are being unfairly shut out of the market.

Finally, concerning the abuse of advertiser data, which reflects the Meta investigation, the initial service is the provision of digital advertising space to businesses. However, the secondary and more problematic “service” is the platform’s use of the data generated by its advertising clients to inform its own product development. A platform can analyse which products are selling well or which user demographics are most valuable and then use these insights to launch its own competing product, such as Facebook Marketplace. This product then has an immediate, unfair advantage. Our consumer type is therefore any business that has paid to advertise on a dominant platform, only to find that platform using its data to become a direct competitor.

Here is a breakdown of what I extracted and why it is critical for our operations.

1. For Our Legal Cases (Litigation & Pre-Litigation)

My primary goal here was to extract the foundational elements for constructing robust legal arguments and identifying new, viable causes of action.

What I Extracted:

Specific Legal Arguments for the “Democratic Memory Law” Case: I extracted the detailed allegations that the Spanish government may have illegally fragmented contracts to circumvent public procurement thresholds , leading to the selection of ideologically biased historians. The subsequent use of these allegedly skewed reports to underpin legislation is framed as a “reckless and negligent misrepresentation”.
A Methodology for Originating UK Competition Claims: The FOCOM AJF.pdf document provided a crucial strategic insight: we can use past Formal Outcome Commitment Decisions (FOCOMs) as a blueprint for new, standalone competition law claims. I extracted the key FOCOM examples, including those involving Amazon (use of seller data, Buy Box bias) , Meta (use of advertiser data) , and Education Software Solutions (unfair contract lock-in).
Procedural Knowledge for the Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT): I extracted detailed analysis on the mechanics of collective proceedings, including the high stakes of “carriage disputes” (where two proposed class representatives compete to lead a case) , the challenges of gathering evidence from a class , and the CAT’s supervisory role.
Critical Time Limits: I noted the instruction to calculate limitation periods for bringing actions in Tort, Contract, and Judicial Review (JR) as of April 2025.

Why I Extracted This:

The “Democratic Memory Law” details provide a ready-made skeleton for a high-profile, public interest legal challenge. It gives us the specific legal hooks (unlawful procurement, misrepresentation) needed to formulate a pre-action letter and statement of claim.
The FOCOM methodology is our key to a sustainable pipeline of UK-based cases. Instead of reacting to events, we can now proactively identify and target companies engaging in conduct the CMA has already flagged as problematic. This saves immense investigatory resources and strengthens our initial assessment of a case’s merit.
Understanding the CAT’s procedures is vital for effective case management and cost control. Knowing the pitfalls of carriage disputes and evidence gathering allows us to prepare our applications more thoroughly and anticipate defendants’ tactics.
Statutory time limits are non-negotiable. This information is fundamental to ensuring we do not lose the right to bring a claim.

2. For Our Public Campaigns & Claimant Recruitment

A legal case is only as strong as the class behind it. My focus here was on intelligence that enables us to lawfully find, inform, and mobilise affected individuals.

What I Extracted:

Compelling Public Narratives: The core injustice of the “Democratic Memory Law” case—the alleged distortion of history and damage to the reputation of UK individuals —is a powerful story for a media campaign. Similarly, narratives of “big tech” misusing data or exploiting small businesses are highly resonant.
Lawful Outreach and Advertising Techniques: I extracted the “CONTACT identification TECHNIQUE” and information on social media marketing strategies. Critically, I also extracted the associated legal risks, such as defamation when making public allegations pre-action and the necessity of complying with claims management regulations (FCA) and advertising standards (ASA).
A Directory of Potential Allies: The documents provided lists of consumer associations, trade unions, and ombudsman services across the UK, Spain, and the EU.

Why I Extracted This:

Strong public campaigns require a simple, powerful narrative. The extracted examples provide the emotional and ethical core of our story, which is essential for gaining media traction, public support, and encouraging potential claimants to step forward.
This intelligence allows us to build a class of claimants both effectively and lawfully. We now have a clear understanding of the regulatory minefield we must navigate. We can design campaigns that find victims without exposing CoCoo to defamation suits or regulatory penalties.
The lists of allies are invaluable. Partnering with established and trusted organisations will amplify our message, lend us credibility, and help us reach affected communities far more efficiently than we could alone.

3. For Our Mediation & Settlement Projects

Ultimately, many of our cases may be resolved through settlement. The intelligence extracted here is crucial for our negotiation strategy.

What I Extracted:

The Rules of Engagement for Settlement: I extracted the specific CAT rules governing settlements. The most critical distinction is between damages awarded at trial versus funds from a negotiated settlement.
The “Reversion to Defendant” Principle: I identified the crucial provision in CAT Rule 94(9)(g) which explicitly states that a settlement term allowing unclaimed funds to revert to the defendant is not, in itself, unreasonable. This contrasts with damages awarded at trial, where unclaimed funds must go to the Access to Justice Foundation.
The Ban on Direct Defendant-Claimant Communication: I noted the important precedent from the McLaren case, which prohibits defendants from communicating directly with class members about the case without the Tribunal’s permission.
The CAT’s “Just and Reasonable” Test: The documents highlight that the CAT must approve any opt-out settlement, ensuring it is fair to the class.

Why I Extracted This:

This intelligence fundamentally shapes our negotiation posture. Knowing the rules allows us to control the process.
The “reversion” principle is a powerful bargaining chip. We can strategically propose a higher overall settlement amount in exchange for allowing the defendant to retain any funds that go unclaimed. This makes the settlement more attractive to the defendant while still securing a significant victory for the class members who do come forward.
The ban on direct communication protects the integrity of our class. It prevents defendants from undermining our collective action by making low-ball offers to individual, often un-advised, claimants. It ensures we negotiate from a position of collective strength.
By understanding the CAT’s approval criteria, we can structure our settlement agreements to maximise the likelihood of them being approved swiftly, ensuring timely justice for the victims we represent.

As the in-house solicitor for the Competition & Consumer Organisation Party Limited (CoCoo), I have analysed the provided intelligence to identify potential collective actions grounded in tort and contract law. My assessment focuses on identifying ‘commonality’—a shared harm across a prospective class of claimants—which is the cornerstone of any viable collective action.

Below is a summary of the most promising collective threats and causes of action derived from the documents.

1. Collective Action for Reputational Harm against the Spanish Government

This potential action arises from CoCoo’s investigation into the procurement process for Spain’s “Ley de Memoria Democrática” (the Law).

Nature of the Collective Threat: The core allegation is that the Spanish government engaged in an illegal procurement process to commission ideologically biased historical reports. ¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹ These skewed reports were then allegedly used to provide a flawed factual basis for the Law, which promotes a distorted historical narrative. ²²²²²²²²²²²²²²²² This action constitutes a potential case of reckless or negligent misrepresentation by a state actor, causing harm to the reputation of specific individuals. ³³³³³³³³³³
Prospective Class Members: Descendants, historical estates, and representative bodies of UK citizens who participated in the Spanish Civil War, particularly those who fought for the Republican cause. ⁴⁴⁴⁴⁴⁴⁴⁴⁴
Commonality of Harm: The common harm is the collective reputational damage inflicted upon this class of UK individuals. ⁵⁵⁵⁵⁵⁵⁵⁵⁵ The Law, allegedly founded on biased evidence, is accused of unfairly portraying the role and motivations of these individuals, thereby damaging their historical legacy and the collective memory of their contribution. ⁶⁶⁶⁶⁶⁶⁶⁶⁶⁶⁶⁶⁶⁶⁶⁶
Potential Defendants: The Spanish Government, specifically the Ministry of Territorial Policy and Democratic Memory, and other responsible Spanish ministries and agencies. ⁷⁷⁷⁷⁷⁷⁷⁷⁷
Potential Legal Basis (Tort):
- A claim could be pursued under the relevant articles of the Spanish Civil Code concerning liability for damages from wrongful acts or omissions.
- The action would assert that the Spanish government committed a “reckless and negligent misrepresentation” to its own nation and to international stakeholders by presenting the Law as based on factually accurate and independent evidence.

Strategic Consideration: While sovereign immunity and jurisdiction present significant hurdles, the public interest and cross-border nature of this claim align with CoCoo’s mission. The alleged illegality of the procurement process provides a potential entry point to challenge the legitimacy of the resulting legislation and the harm it has caused.

2. Standalone Competition Law Claims Based on Past Commitment Decisions

A significant opportunity exists to launch novel standalone collective actions under the UK’s Competition Act 1998. The strategy involves identifying companies engaged in conduct similar to that which has already been investigated by the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) and resulted in Formal Outcome Commitment Decisions (FOCOMs).

While FOCOMs do not constitute a formal finding of infringement, they reveal the CMA’s competition concerns and provide a strong indication of business practices vulnerable to legal challenge. ¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹ The following are prime areas for developing such claims:

A. Unfair Online Marketplace Practices

Nature of the Collective Threat: Dominant e-commerce platforms may be abusing their position by using non-public data from third-party sellers to gain a competitive advantage for their own retail operations, or by unfairly biasing search results and “Buy Box” features. ¹² This is analogous to the concerns investigated in the CMA’s Amazon Marketplace case. ¹³
Prospective Class Members: UK-based third-party sellers on large online marketplaces (other than Amazon).
Commonality of Harm: Class members share a common harm of financial loss, resulting from suppressed sales and an inability to compete on a level playing field due to the platform’s anti-competitive conduct. ¹⁴
Potential Legal Basis (Statutory Tort): A standalone action alleging abuse of a dominant position in breach of the Chapter II prohibition of the Competition Act 1998. ¹⁵¹⁵

B. Unfair Customer “Lock-in” by Dominant Software Providers

Nature of the Collective Threat: Dominant providers of essential business software (e.g., in education, legal, or accounting sectors) may be locking customers into long-term contracts and creating barriers to switching, thereby stifling competition. ¹⁶ This reflects the issues investigated in the Education Software Solutions Ltd (ESS) case. ¹⁷¹⁷
Prospective Class Members: Businesses and public sector bodies (e.g., schools, small firms) reliant on a dominant software provider.
Commonality of Harm: The shared harm is financial loss from being forced to pay supra-competitive prices and being unable to switch to superior or more cost-effective alternatives due to the anti-competitive lock-in. ¹⁸
Potential Legal Basis (Statutory Tort / Contract):
- A primary claim for abuse of a dominant position under Chapter II of the Competition Act 1998.
- Potential secondary claims for breach of contract if terms are deemed unenforceable.

C. Misuse of Advertiser Data by Digital Platforms

Nature of the Collective Threat: Dominant digital platforms that generate advertising revenue may be using competitively sensitive data gathered from their advertisers to develop their own competing products and services. ²⁰ This conduct is similar to the concerns in the CMA’s investigation into Meta’s use of data. ²¹²¹
Prospective Class Members: Businesses that have advertised on such platforms and subsequently faced competition from the platform itself, using insights gleaned from their data.
Commonality of Harm: The common financial loss stems from the platform unfairly leveraging the advertisers’ own data to undermine their market position and sales. ²²
Potential Legal Basis (Statutory Tort): A standalone claim for abuse of a dominant position under Chapter II of the Competition Act 1998. ²³²³²³²³

These identified threats represent significant opportunities for CoCoo to advance its mission by building robust collective actions. The “Memoria Historica” case is a novel public interest challenge, while the FOCOM-based strategy provides a repeatable methodology for tackling anti-competitive conduct in the UK.

HAZTE MIEMBRO GRATIS PROYECTOS ABIERTOS QUIENES SOMOS MEDIACION DIPLOMACIA DONACIONES PRIVACIDAD CONDICIONES

Insights from the Documents

1. For Our Legal Cases (Litigation & Pre-Litigation)

2. For Our Public Campaigns & Claimant Recruitment

3. For Our Mediation & Settlement Projects

1. For Our Legal Cases (Litigation & Pre-Litigation)

2. For Our Public Campaigns & Claimant Recruitment

3. For Our Mediation & Settlement Projects

1. Collective Action for Reputational Harm against the Spanish Government

2. Standalone Competition Law Claims Based on Past Commitment Decisions

A. Unfair Online Marketplace Practices

B. Unfair Customer “Lock-in” by Dominant Software Providers

C. Misuse of Advertiser Data by Digital Platforms